In this paper we present the logic MP⊏ that explicates reasoning on the basis of prioritized obligations. Although formal criteria to handle prioritized obligations have been formulated in the literature, little attention has been paid to the actual (non-monotonic) reasoning that makes use of these criteria. The dynamic proof theory of MP⊏ fills this lacuna. This paper focuses on premise sets consisting of possibly conflicting prima facie obligations that have a modular order. MP⊏ allows to derive -inter alia-the actual, all-things-considered obligations from such premise sets. It is an adaptive logic defined in the new generic format from [35] , whence a rich meta-theory is immediately available (e.g. soundness and completeness, idempotence, reflexivity, etc.). In addition, we establish some meta-theoretic results that are specific to the context of prioritized obligations. With the aid of concrete examples, we illustrate properties of MP⊏ which improve on other existing criteria for prioritized obligations. Finally, we show how this logic may also be applied to the context of prioritized belief bases.
Introduction

Deontic Conflicts and Adaptive Logics
Deontic conflicts have been the subject of much debate in philosophical logic and computer science. 1 Roughly speaking, a deontic conflict occurs if two or more obligations
2 cannot be mutually realized -we will present a more precise characterization of deontic conflicts in Section 1. 3 . In the face of such conflicts, Standard Deontic Logic (henceforth SDL) leads to triviality in view of the rule (D): from OA, infer ¬O¬A. Giving up (D) is necessary but not sufficient to allow for deontic conflicts: whenever the premises feature a deontic conflict, the other rules of SDL still cause deontic explosion, i.e. the conclusion that everything is obligatory.
To solve this problem, various conflict-tolerant deontic logics have been developed over the last few decades. As Lou Goble points out in his [12, pp. 462-465] , there are basically three options to avoid deontic explosion in the face of conflicting obligations: (i) reject the modal inheritance rule: from OA and A ⊢ B infer OB (see e.g. [11, 12] ); (ii) reject the axiom of aggregation (AND): OA ∧ OB ⊃ O(A ∧ B) (see e.g. [36, 8, 32] ); (iii) weaken one or more of the non-modal connectives. Examples of the third option can be found in [6, 29] , where the classical negation is replaced by a paraconsistent one, and in [23, 7] , where a relevant implication is used.
Implementing any of these options in terms of a monotonic logic falls prey to the objection that a number of intuitive inferences are no longer valid. There is a variety of non-monotonic formalizations that are conflict-tolerant and give rise to stronger consequence relations (e.g. Input/Output logics with constraints [22] and Horty's [16] ). However, these approaches typically lack a proof theory that explicates the (dynamics of) reasoning on the basis of deontic conflicts.
Recently, adaptive deontic logics have been developed that are satisfactory in all the discussed respects: while allowing for genuine deontic conflicts, they offer a strong consequence relation and a dynamic proof theory (see [3, 25, 33, 34] ). Every such adaptive logic is based on a monotonic conflict-tolerant deontic logic that is designed in terms of one of the three options (i)-(iii). The general idea of the adaptive logics is that the omitted rules of standard deontic logic are recuperated as much as possible -unless this leads to some form of explosion. In this way we obtain a significantly larger consequence set compared to the logic that defines the monotonic core of the adaptive logic. Moreover, given that the adaptive logics are defined in the standard format from [2] , an intuitive dynamic proof theory that is sound and complete with respect to a static semantics, and a great number of metatheoretic results are immediately available.
Take for example the logic P2.1 r from [25] . This system is based on Goble's SDL a P e from [8] . The semantics of SDL a P e offers a way to interpret conflicts between prima facie obligations. The latter are expressed by the modal operator O e . (AND) does not hold for these: SDLaPe (O e A ∧ O e B) ⊃ O e (A ∧ B). Goble's system also allows for the expression of actual, all-things-considered obligations: obligations that behave classically and are considered as guiding our actions. These are expressed with the aid of the operator O a . Aggregation holds for such obligations: ⊢ SDLaPe (O a A ∧ O a B) ⊃ O a (A ∧ B), and also ⊢ SDLaPe (O a A ∧ O e B) ⊃ O e (A ∧ B).
The adaptive logic P2.1 r from [25] makes it possible to turn prima facie obligations into all-things-considered obligations, on the condition that they are not contradicted by other prima facie obligations. This is realized by allowing for conditional applications of the rule (O e O a ): O e A ⊃ O a A. As a consequence, we regain the rule of aggregation for all those obligations that are not involved in a conflict. The rules of SDL are thus recuperated by making the detour via all-things-considered obligations.
Ordered Sets of Obligations
In this paper, the idea implemented in P2.1
r will be applied to prioritized obligations. Our logic MP ⊏ allows one to derive from a prima facie obligation to bring about A the all-things-considered obligation to bring about A, on the assumption that there is no conflicting obligation with at least the same priority. Note that in many cases, our norms come in different degrees of importance, specificity or urgency. For instance, in most countries, there is a fixed hierarchy between different kinds of traffic rules: those enforced by the signaling boards, by marks on the road, by traffic lights, or by a police officer's commands. In some specific situation, e.g. when we happen to be at the site of a car accident, the traffic rules may be overruled by more urgent and compelling obligations, such as taking an injured kid away from the site of the accident. When a conflict arises in these cases, the agents typically reason from their prima facie obligations and their respective degrees of priority, to find out what they ought to do. The idea that prima facie obligations are to some extent ordered, and that this may help to resolve contradictions between them, was initiated by Ross in his [31] . Formal investigations of this idea started with [1] , and are still ongoing, see e.g. [13, 14, 5] . Most authors in the field start from an ordered set of obligations, and provide a criterion to fix a set of all-things-considered obligations. However, they do not provide a proof theory that explicates the reasoning that could lead to such a selection. As we will argue, adaptive logics are a good candidate to fill this lacuna.
Our logic MP ⊏ allows us to solve the problem of prioritized conflicts within a new generic format of prioritized adaptive logics that was studied in [35] . As a result, many important meta-theorems, as well as a full-blown proof theory and semantics are immediately available.
To completely settle the working ground, we need to make two restrictions. First of all, we will focus on sets of obligations that are ordered in a modular way. 3 This means that the set of prima facie obligations can be represented by a tuple: O = O 1 , O 2 , . . . , where O 1 contains the most important obligations, O 2 the obligations that are less important, O 3 obligations that are still less important, and so on.We will sometimes say that an obligation A has priority level i, by which we mean that A ∈ O i . Note however that the same obligation may occur in different sets O i . We will use O to refer to the set O 1 ∪ O 2 ∪ . . ., hence the set of all prima facie obligations (irrespective of their priority level).
We will also restrict ourselves to the framework of monadic deontic logic in this paper. Although it is possible to generalize our treatment of prioritized obligations to a dyadic setting, this would severely lengthen the paper since it leads to problems in its own right. 4 We will return to these restrictions in the concluding section, where we discuss possible extensions of the current system.
Some Examples
Before turning to the formal system, let us present some concrete examples. These will help us to clarify the logic we present below, and to compare it to other approaches in the literature. Case 1 is inspired by [13, pp. 6-7] , Case 2 by the visiting daughters example from [17, p. 581] , and Case 3 by the famous Smith example from [16, p. 37] . Case 1. Mary had a car accident, with some minor material damage as a result. She faces the obligation to stay at the site of the accident to fill in insurance papers (S). However, she also promised her mother to pick her up from the supermarket and take her home (M ). Finally, her boss asked her to post an urgent letter this same morning (P ). It is impossible to post the letter in time, and to fill in the entire insurance poll: S excludes P . However, she can call her mother to notify her she will be a bit later, and hence do both S and M without too much trouble. The obligation to do S has a higher priority than both the one to do P and the one to do M , while the latter two are equally important.
Case 2. Michael has promised his daughter to pay her a visit today (D). However, he recieves the news that his uncle is very ill, and now faces the problem that he should also visit him (U ). The obligation to do U is more urgent than the one to do D. Moreover, U and D are practically incompatible. Finally, Michael also told his nephew he would drop by whenever he was around (N ). The nephew lives close to the uncle, hence U and N can be combined easily, while N and D exclude each other. Visiting the nephew is less important than visiting the daughter.
Case 3. According to federal law, Smith has the obligation to pay taxes and either serve in the army or perform alternative service to his country: T ∧(F ∨S). However, according to his political convictions, he ought not to pay taxes (¬T ). Moreover, since he feels responsible for his family, he thinks he should not serve in the army (¬F ). This last obligation takes priority over all the other ones, while his political convictions are still more important to him than the laws of his country. In the first two examples, we used a notion of impossibility, e.g. when we said in Case 1 that it is "impossible" for Mary to both stay at the site of the accident (S) and post the letter (P ). Inspired by input-output logic [22] , we will henceforth speak of "constraints" to refer to statements about practical or physical matters of fact that restrict the kind of actions we may perform. We will assume the set of constraints C to be consistent and closed under classical logic, i.e. C = Cn CL (C).
We may now express in a more precise way what is meant by a deontic conflict. A deontic conflict is always relative to the set of prima facie obligations O and a set of constraints C. That our prima facie obligations conflict with our constraints, means that in view of the latter, we cannot mutually realize each of the former. More formally, it means that O ∪ C is inconsistent. 5 As we indicated before, our actual obligations should properly guide our actions, whence we want them to be conflict-free according to this general concept: we want it to be possible that each of them can be carried out, according to the given set of constraints. 6 In Section 2, we will discuss how the various examples are translated into premise sets for the adaptive logic MP ⊏ . The latter is presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents some meta-theoretic results that are specific to the context of prioritized obligations. We will return to the examples in Section 5 to illustrate the proof theory of MP ⊏ and to compare some existing criteria for preferred obligations to this new system. In Section 6, we briefly argue that our logic may also be applied to prioritized belief bases. We mention some prospects for further research and loose ends in the concluding section.
The Logic MP
As mentioned in Section 1, every adaptive logic is based on a monotonic logic, which it typically strengthens non-monotonically. In the language of adaptive logics, such an underlying logic is called the "lower limit logic" of the adaptive logic. Hence we will first define a lower limit logic MP, which can be seen as SDL extended with a multi-modal variant of the logic P from [8] .
The Language of MP
The language of MP contains an infinite number of conflict-tolerant oughtoperators:
The formula O i A should be read as: there is a prima facie obligation of priority level i that tells us to do or bring about A. It is important to note that the priority of the normative standard gets higher as the priority index gets lower. O 1 -obligations are thus the strongest, most compelling prima facie obligations, O 2 -obligations are weaker, and so on. Each O i -operator behaves exactly like the O e -operator from SDL a P e -see Section 1. 1 . Actual obligations will be denoted by the O-operator without index. This O-operator behaves just as the ordinary O-operator from SDL.
Henceforth, let N denote the set of natural numbers without 0. L will refer to the standard language of classical propositional logic, built up from the connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, ⊃, ≡ and a set S of sentential letters. We use W l to refer to the set of literals (sentential letters and their negations). L M is L extended with the modal operators O and O i i∈N . Although it is possible to define the respective 5 Since constraints may also be of a purely logical kind, our concept includes more basic deontic conflicts, such as having the obligation to do A and the obligation to do ¬A. 6 Although we do not discuss them here, one might also have deontic constraints on the set of actual obligations. Such constraints relate to the concept of "derogation" as studied in e.g. [1] . To derogate O in A means to interpret O in such a way that A is no longer entailed by it. For example, where ¬A is a basic human right, and O is a set of laws that entail that A is obligatory, a judge may select a subset of O such that A is no longer entailed. duals P and P i i∈N , we will not do so here, since we are only interested in reasoning about obligations.
Where W is the set of all well-formed formulas of L, the set of well-formed formulas of L M is defined as the smallest set W M that satisfies the following conditions:
We will now explain how an ordered set of obligations, together with a set of constraints, is translated into a premise set. Physical and practical constraints will be translated as follows: where A is ruled out by such a constraint, ¬OA is introduced as a premise. Thus, the impossibility to do both S and P will be expressed by ¬O(P ∧ S). This is justified by the observation that we want our actual obligations to be obeyable in a practical sense, as required by the "ought implies can"-principle (OIC): OA ⊃ ♦A (where ♦A expresses that A is physically or practically possible). Note that (OIC) implies ¬♦A ⊃ ¬OA by contraposition. Of course, a more natural approach would make use of additional nomological modalities, but this would severely complicate the language of the system. Logical constraints will be dealt with solely by the logic MP itself, as we will explain in Section 2. 2. This means that the translation works as follows.
. is a sequence of sets of propositions that represent obligatory states or actions, and C is a set of physical and practical constraints, we define:
In the remainder, we will use Γ as a metavariable for sets that are obtained by such a translation. Let us illustrate this by the examples from Section 1.3. These will be translated as follows:
Since replacement of equivalents holds within the scope of the O-operator, we can rewrite the first two sets as Γ
The Logic MP
In order to allow for conflicting obligations, we will generalize Goble's multirelational semantics for the system P -see e.g. [8] . The latter is itself a generalization of the semantics of SDL: not one, but many accessibility relations are in play.Goble defines a model in terms of a set of accessibility relations:
To handle prioritized sets of obligations, two basic changes to Goble's P-system will be made.
First of all, we use a set of sets of accessibility relations R = {R 1 , R 2 , . . .}. Where i ∈ N, R i refers to a set of prima facie obligations of priority level i, that all have the same priority level i. This way, two prima facie obligations with the same priority may still be conflicting. As may be expected, the O i -operator is linked to the set R i .
The other change has to do with the additional O-operator. Since we want this operator to behave classically, it is stipulated that there is a single accessibility relation R that corresponds to the accessibility relation of SDL. This implies that the logic itself takes care of the logical constraints on the set of actual obligations: for every self-contradictory formula A, ¬OA is an MP-theorem.
An MP-model M is a quintuple W, R, R, v, w 0 , where W is a set of possible worlds, R = {R 1 , R 2 , . . .} is a set of non-empty sets of serial accessibility relations on W , R is a serial accessibility relation, v : S × W → {0, 1} is an assignment function and w 0 ∈ W is the actual world.
The valuation v M defined by the model M is characterized by: C1 where
We use M MP (Γ) to refer to the set of MP-models of Γ. Finally, Γ |= MP A iff all MP-models of Γ verify A.
A syntax for MP is obtained as follows. We extend an axiomatization of classical propositional logic (henceforth CL) with the following axioms (where A, B ∈ W):
D OA ⊃ ¬O¬A and close it under modus ponens (MP) and the following rules (where A, B ∈ W):
where ⊢ indicates membership in the set of MP-axioms. The two axioms (K) and (D) together with the rules (MP) and (RN) deliver SDL for O. The rules (RM i ), (P i ) and (RN i ) deliver Goble's P for all operators O i . Note that there are no bridging rules that link the different ought-operators: OA does not imply
In Section 4, we will discuss even more general results with regards to the conflict-tolerance of MP.
We define Γ ⊢ MP A iff there are
Note that this definition immediately entails that the conse-quence relation is compact. The proof of the following theorem is outlined in the appendix: 
The Adaptive Approach
Recall that the central aim of this paper is to capture how we can reason from an ordered set O of prima facie obligations and a set C of constraints towards a set of actual obligations. This will be realized in terms of a dynamic proof theory that explicates such reasoning. In Section 3.2, we will present this proof theory in detail. To facilitate the reading, we will introduce the basic concepts here in an informal way.
In our current formal framework, to derive actual obligations from prima facie obligations may be realized by the following rule (where i ∈ N):
Recall that this rule is not valid in MP. However, adding (O i O) to the axioms of MP would result in plain triviality whenever our prima facie obligations are jointly incompatible.
The adaptive logic we will present uses the language and inference rules of MP, but enhances it with the defeasible application of (O i O). As soon as such a particular application turns out to be harmful, the logic ensures that it is retracted. However, other applications of the same rule may still be allowed for by the logic.
The central motor behind adaptive logics is the assumption that certain formulas -the so-called abnormalities -are false "until and unless proven otherwise". In this case, abnormalities express that something is a prima facie obligation (of some priority level i), but not an actual obligation. Hence any formula of the form O i A∧¬OA is an abnormality. Consider
Three problems arise when implementing this idea. A complication that is well-known from the study of adaptive logics consists in the fact that we cannot always derive abnormalities separately, though we may be able to derive disjunctions of them. This is the case in our example:
If we would assume both O 1 S ∧ ¬OS and O 2 P ∧ ¬OP to be false, we would end up with an MP-trivial consequence set. This is avoided by taking derivable disjunctions of abnormalities, or Dab-formulas in short, into account -see Section 3.2 where this is formally specified.
A second difficulty concerns the form of the abnormalities. Simply taking O i A ∧ ¬OA for any A ∈ W as the form of the abnormalities, leads to a socalled flip-flop-logic: a logic that considers every prima facie obligation as actual when there are no conflicts at all, but that reduces to MP as soon as a Dabformula is derivable from the premise set. In our example, we can prove that
Hence M would become problematic in view of Γ 1 and OM would not be derivable. This difficulty is overcome by using a slightly more complex form of the abnormalities, borrowed from [26] .
The idea behind the new form of the abnormalities is this: let Θ be a finite and non-empty set of literals and let Θ be the disjunction of the members of Θ (if Θ = {A}, Θ = A). The obligation to do Θ is said to behave abnormally, if for some i ∈ N, O i Θ ∧ ¬O Θ is true, or if for some non-empty
This warrants that if some part of the disjunction Θ already behaves abnormally, then Θ automatically becomes suspicious as well. The resulting abnormality will be abbreviated by σ i (Θ). As we did for obligations, we will speak of the priority level of a given abnormality: σ i (Θ) has priority level i.
The third problem is specific to this paper: how can the logic take the priorities of the obligations (vs. abnormalities) into account? Note that the lower the index of an abnormality, the more we should avoid this abnormality, since it corresponds to an obligation of a higher level. We will use the generic format from [35] to deal with the priority order on the obligations resp. abnormalities. The main idea is that if two prima facie obligations are conflicting and one of them has higher priority, then the latter will be actualized (unless there is another, yet more important obligation that conflicts with it).
Some Definitions
In this section, we will present the formal apparatus that characterizes the logic MP ⊏ . We start with some general preliminary tools and briefly explain the MP ⊏ -semantics. After that, we define the dynamic proof theory.
The General Framework. The logic MP ⊏ is defined by a triple: (i) the lower limit logic MP, (ii) a sequence of sets of abnormalities Ω i i∈N , and (iii) the strategy ⊏-minimal abnormality. 8 The lower limit logic provides all the consequences that hold unconditionally, i.e. without relying on the normal behavior of the premises.
In order to define the sequence of sets of abnormalities, we need some technical preparations. Where Θ is a non-empty and finite subset of W l , we will use the following abbreviation:
To avoid notational clutter, we will skip the set brackets for concrete sets of literals, e.g. we write σ(p, ¬q) instead of σ({p, ¬q}). To get better grip on the form of the abnormalities and their abbreviation, consider the following examples:
Note that the number of disjuncts of an abnormality σ i (Θ) grows exponentially with the number of literals in Θ. Also, where Θ ′ is a non-empty subset of Θ, we have that
We thus obtain the sequence of abnormalities Ω i i∈N . Let henceforth Ω = i∈N Ω i , and let Dab(∆) denote a disjunction of members of Ω.
Semantics. The easiest way to explain how the order on the obligations is implemented in MP ⊏ is by considering its semantics. The set of MP ⊏ -models of Γ is a subset of the set of MP-models of Γ. This immediately entails that MP ⊏ strengthens MP -see also Theorem 7 in Section 3. 3 . To explain how the MP ⊏ -models are selected, we need some more definitions.
For every MP-model M , we define its abnormal part Ab(M ) = {A ∈ Ω | M A}. Models are selected resp. deselected by the adaptive logic in view of their abnormal part. This abnormal part can contain abnormalities from the many different sets Ω i , whence we may consider it as a tuple:
. This means that we can define a lexicographic order ⊏ on the abnormal parts, and more generally, on ℘(Ω) as a whole:
To illustrate the above definition, consider the following example:
That is, ∆ beats ∆ ′ at level 2, and ∆ ′ beats ∆ ′′ at level 3. It follows immediately that ∆ ⊏ ∆ ′′ . However, ∆ ⊏ ∆ ′′′ , since the two are incomparable at level 1. All this becomes a lot more clear as soon as we represent these sets of abnormalities Θ in columns, where each separate column represents the intersection of Θ with an Ω i -see Table 1 . Once we have the definition of ⊏, the MP ⊏ -semantics is fairly simple. The MP ⊏ -models of Γ are those MP-models of Γ whose abnormal part is ⊏-minimal. We use M MP⊏ (Γ) to refer to the set of all such models, also called the ⊏-minimal abnormals models of Γ.
Proof Theory. Every line in an MP ⊏ -proof consists of four elements: a line number i, a formula A, a justification and a finite condition ∆ ⊂ Ω. Where Γ is the set of premises, the inference rules are given by the following three tables (we omit the line numbers and justifications):
A stage of a proof is a sequence of lines and a proof is a chain of such stages. Adding a line to a proof by applying one of the above rules brings the proof to its next stage, which is the sequence of all lines written so far.
Recall that we wanted to allow for the defeasible application of the rule (O i O) from Section 3.1. The third item of the following lemma shows how this rule can be applied in an MP ⊏ -proof, using the conditional rule RC:
Lemma 1 Each of the following holds:
(i) Where Θ is a finite set of literals,
Where A ∈ W and O i A is derived on a line l of an MP ⊏ -proof from Γ, we can derive OA on a line l ′ in an extension of this proof.
Proof. Ad (i): Suppose
Suppose O i A is derived on a line l of an MP ⊏ -proof from Γ. Let the condition of line l be ∆. By the conditional rule (RC) and item (ii), we can derive OA on a line l ′ in an extension of the proof, on the condition ∆ ∪ { J σ i (Θ j )}, where J Θ j is a conjunctive normal form of A.
Lemma 1(iii) indicates that it is possible to apply (O
To explain in what sense this application is defeasible, we will need to introduce a few more concepts and definitions.
At every stage of a proof, a marking definition -see below -determines for each line in the proof whether it is marked or not. That a line which has as its second element A is marked at stage s, indicates that according to our best insights at this stage, A cannot be considered as a consequence on that line. If the line is unmarked at stage s, this indicates that A is a consequence, again, according to our best insights at this stage.
Dab(∆) is a Dab-formula at stage s of a proof, iff it is the second element of a line in the proof with an empty condition. 
We say that ϕ ⊆ Ω is a choice set of Σ s (Γ) iff for every ∆ ∈ Σ s (Γ), ϕ∩∆ = ∅. For the border case where Σ s (Γ) = ∅, this means that every set ϕ ⊆ Ω is a choice set of Σ s (Γ), including the empty set. We say that ϕ is a ⊏-minimal choice set of Σ s (Γ) iff there is no choice set ψ of Σ s (Γ) such that ψ ⊏ ϕ. Let Φ ⊏ s (Γ) be the set of ⊏-minimal choice sets of Σ s (Γ). It is proven in [35] that at every stage s of a proof from Γ, Φ ⊏ s (Γ) is non-empty. Let us try to give an intuitive characterization of the above concepts. Suppose we have derived a number of Dab-formulas at stage s. Hence we have to acknowledge that some abnormalities have to be true (since the Dab-formulas are derived on the empty condition). More specifically, we know that at least the abnormalities from some choice set ϕ of Σ s (Γ) have to be true. We then select those choice sets of Σ s (Γ) that are ⊏-minimal. Φ ⊏ s (Γ) thus represents a stage-relative interpretation of how abnormal our premise set is. We now use this interpretation to mark lines in an MP ⊏ -proof from Γ:
Definition 4 MP ⊏ -Marking: a line l with formula A is marked at stage s iff, where its condition is ∆:
, there is no line on which A is derived on a condition Θ for which
Put differently: a line with formula A is unmarked at stage s iff its condition has an empty intersection with at least one ϕ ∈ Φ ⊏ s (Γ), and for every ψ ∈ Φ ⊏ s (Γ), there is a line on which A is derived on a condition ∆ such that ∆ ∩ ψ = ∅.
This proof theory reflects a dynamic aspect of our reasoning about conflicting obligations: we may take some obligation as an actual obligation at some point, but only later on learn that this leads to a conflict on the level of the actual obligations. This may be due to the additional information, but it may also be the result of our reasoning about the same set of obligations. At that point, we have to retract some of our earlier conclusions. In Section 5, we will clarify this mechanism, using the canonical examples from Section 1.
As lines can become marked, unmarked and marked again throughout a proof, we also need a stable notion of derivability:
Definition 5 A is finally derived from Γ on line l of a finite stage s iff (i) A is the second element of line l, (ii) line l is not marked at stage s, and (iii) every extension of the stage in which line l is marked may be further extended in such a way that line l is unmarked again.
Definition 6 Γ ⊢ MP⊏ A ( A is finally MP ⊏ -derivable from Γ) iff A is finally derived on a line of an MP ⊏ -proof from Γ.
Some Metatheoretic Properties
As defined above, the logic MP ⊏ fits the format of a prioritized adaptive logic from [35] . This means that a rich meta-theory is immediately available. We will only mention some of these results here for illustrative purposes, and refer to [35] for more details.
Theorem 2 Γ ⊢ MP⊏ A iff Γ |= MP⊏ A (Soundness and Completeness)
Theorem 3 If M ∈ M MP (Γ) − M MP⊏ (Γ), then there is an M ′ ∈ M MP⊏ (Γ) such that Ab(M ′ ) ⊏ Ab(M ). (Strong Reassurance) Corollary 1 If Γ has MP-models, then Γ has MP ⊏ -models. (Reassurance) Theorem 4 If Γ ′ ⊆ Cn MP⊏ (Γ), then Cn MP⊏ (Γ) = Cn MP⊏ (Γ∪Γ ′ ). (Cautious Indifference) Theorem 5 Cn MP⊏ (Γ) = Cn MP⊏ (Cn MP⊏ (Γ)). (Fixed Point) Theorem 6 Γ ⊆ Cn MP⊏ (Γ). (Reflexivity) Theorem 7 Cn MP (Γ) ⊆ Cn MP⊏ (Γ). (MP ⊏ strengthens MP) Theorem 8 If Γ ∪ {A} ⊢ MP⊏ B, then Γ ⊢ MP⊏ A ⊃ B. (Deduction Theorem)
Some Specific Properties of MP ⊏
In this section, we present some properties that are more specific to the logic MP ⊏ and its application to premise sets of the form Γ O,C . The first theorem and corollary below indicate to what extent MP and MP ⊏ are conflict-tolerant. The other theorem and the subsequent corollaries express a lower bound on the set of actual obligations that are MP ⊏ -derivable from any set Γ O,C . We refer to the appendix for the proofs of Theorems 9 and 10.
Theorem 9 Γ O,C has MP-models iff (every A ∈ O is CL-satisfiable and C is CL-satisfiable).
So Γ O,C may contain any conflict, as long as the set of constraints is internally consistent and there are no prima facie obligations that are contradictory in themselves. A nice property of deontic adaptive logics in general is that they are just as conflict-tolerant as their lower limit logic. This follows immediately from the property of Reassurance (see Corollary 1). Hence we obtain: Corollary 2 If every A ∈ O is CL-satisfiable and C is CL-satisfiable, then Γ O,C has MP ⊏ -models.
Note that since the O-operator from MP ⊏ behaves according to the Ooperator from SDL, it follows that whenever Γ O,C is MP-satisfiable, then there is a B ∈ W such that Γ O,C MP⊏ OB. Hence the logic MP ⊏ also avoids deontic explosion, as long as the antecedent of Corollary 2 holds.
To spell out a lower bound on the set of actual obligations that are MP ⊏ -derivable from a set Γ O,C , we first introduce two more concepts:
• conflict-free up to level n iff the set {A ∈ O i | i ≤ n} ∪ C is CL-satisfiable.
• conflict-free iff O ∪ C is CL-satisfiable.
Note that Γ O,C is conflict-free whenever the prima facie obligations are not in conflict with the set of constraints -see Section 1.3 where we explained our notion of a deontic conflict relative to a set of constraints.
Theorem 10 If Γ O,C is conflict-free up to level n, then the following holds for all i ≤ n:
The following properties can easily be obtained from Theorem 10 and previously mentioned results. Corollary 3(i) follows from Theorem 10 in view of Theorem 7, Corollary 3(ii) follows from Theorem 10 in view of Theorem 6. Corollary 4 follows from Theorem 10 and Corollary 3 in view of Definition 7.
Corollary 3 If Γ O,C is conflict-free up to level n, then each of the following holds for all i ≤ n:
C is conflict-free, then each of the following holds for all i ∈ N:
Corollary 4 implies that if there is no conflict between any of the prima facie obligations in view of the constraints, then all prima facie obligations and their CL-consequences will be considered as actual obligations (irrespective of their priority). Note that Theorem 10 only serves as a lower bound on Cn MP⊏ (Γ); as we will see in the next section, MP ⊏ is actually a lot stronger than this lower bound.
The Examples Reconsidered
Illustration of the Proof Theory
We will use the first example to illustrate the proof theory of MP ⊏ . Recall that Γ
We start an MP ⊏ -proof from Γ ′ 1 with the use of the rule PREM:
At this stage, there is no marking at all: since no Dab-formulas have been derived, Φ
Mary may infer from this that M is an actual obligation, on the conditional assumption that O 2 M ∧ ¬OM is false. Hence the proof continues like this:
The crucial move is made between stage 5 and 6: we can see that by the application of the conditional rule RC, the abnormality O 2 M ∧ ¬OM is pushed to the condition. Below, we will skip the intermediary step represented at line 5 -note that this is perfectly in line with the definition of the conditional rule RC. Since Φ ⊏ 6 (Γ ′ 1 ) = {∅}, line 6 is unmarked at this stage, which indicates that at this stage, OM is considered as a consequence of the premise set. To illustrate why Definition 5 makes use of the notion of an extension of a proof, consider the following continuation of the proof (we restate line 6):
At stage 8 of the proof, the second element of line 8 is the only Dab-formula in the proof, hence it is a minimal Dab-formula. According to the definitions from Section 3.2, Σ 8 (Γ
This implies that line 6 is marked at stage 8, which is indicated by the 8 -sign. However, we can extend the proof such that line 6 becomes unmarked at a later stage:
As a result, the formula on line 8 is not a minimal Dab-formula anymore. We get that Φ ⊏ 9 (Γ ′ 1 ) = {{O 2 P ∧ ¬OP }}. In this particular case, line 6 will remain unmarked in every extension of the proof. Along the same lines, we can extend the proof to finally derive OS:
The formula at line 9 does no harm to this derivation, since O 1 S ∧ ¬OS is freed from suspicion, so to speak, by the abnormality O 2 P ∧ ¬OP -note that {O 2 P ∧ ¬OP } ⊏ {O 1 S ∧ ¬OS}.
Mediocrity Does Not Rule
Consider the following MP ⊏ -proof from Γ
As a result, only line 7 is marked. Line 6 will remain unmarked in every extension of this proof, whence OU is finally derivable: Michael has the obligation to visit his sick uncle. Since this removes the obligation to visit his daughter, we can also derive that Michael has to pass by his nephew (at line 8) -note that both U and N can be fulfilled, and all that kept Michael from visiting his nephew was the (now overridden) obligation to visit his daughter.
This example is instructive in that it shows a clear difference between MP ⊏ and the criterion of "Least Exposure" from Alchourrón and Makinsons [1] . According to this criterion, an obligation A is preferred if and only if it is an element of a maximal consistent subset Θ of the prima facie obligations, and every other maximal consistent subset ∆ that does not contain A is more exposed. In our terminology, that ∆ is more exposed than Θ means that ∆ contains obligations with a higher priority index than any of the obligations in Θ. Now consider the example. There are two maximal consistent subsets: {U, N } and {D}. Since the latter is less exposed than the former, Alchourrón and Makinson's criterion yields D as a preferred obligation: Michael ought to visit his daughter, which also means that he cannot visit his uncle and his nephew. Hansen refers to this as the "Mediocrity Rules"-problem in his [13] , and sees it as a severe drawback of Alchourrón and Makinson's criterion. This problem is avoided by MP ⊏ : an obligation can only be suspended if it is involved in a deontic conflict, with obligations of the same or a higher priority level.
Relevance-Sensitivity
Consider Case 3, and its translation into
Clearly, there is a conflict between the first and the second obligation. However, a specific property of the logic MP ⊏ is that it reduces such conflicts to conflicts between minimal disjunctions of literals. This is due to the fact that (i) MP validates modal inheritance (RM i ) and (ii) MP ⊏ is a strengthening of MP (see Theorem 7).
Let us explain what is going on, for this particular example. Note that Γ 3 ⊢ MP O 3 T and Γ 3 ⊢ MP O 3 (F ∨ S). As a result, the obligations to do F ∨ S and the one to do ¬F will not be considered problematic, since the real problem lies with T :
As a result, MP ⊏ considers only the atom T to be involved in the conflict, whereas F ∨ S and ¬F are actualized.
We call this property relevance-sensitivity, echoing the concept of relevance in belief revision. A full comparison with relevant belief revision lies beyond the scope of the present paper, but let us briefly spell out the core intuitions.
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A proto-typical example to explain the idea behind relevant belief revision is the revision of a belief base ∆ = {p ∧ q} by the new information A = ¬p. A relevant belief revision ∆+A is one that yields q. The underlying idea is that, notwithstanding the formulation of ∆, q is not relevant to the new information, whence it can be upheld without any problems. In a similar vain, a logic that deals with conflicting sets of obligations should be able to trace down those obligations that are relevant to the conflict and consider the other obligations as unproblematic, irrespective of the initial formulation of the whole set of obligations.
MP ⊏ has this property in common with the logic P2.1 r from [25] . Most of the existing criteria in the literature on prioritized information (beliefs, obligations, defaults) rely on (a selection among) the maximal consistent subsets from a (possibly inconsistent) base, and therefore depend quite heavily on the way this base is formulated. Examples are again Alchourrón and Makinson's Least Exposure, but also Brewka's preferred remainders, Nebel's prioritized removals, Prakken's criterion for hierarchic rebuttal and Sartor's "prevailing" relation.
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More recently, the same basic idea was applied in Input/Output-logic by Boella and Van Der Torre, see [5] . Notwithstanding all the subtle differences between these systems, they have one thing in common: if some obligation is stated as a conjunction (such as e.g. O 3 (T ∧ (F ∨ S))), and one of the conjuncts is involved in a conflict, this renders the whole obligation useless.
In the case of the logic MP ⊏ , we can derive the actual obligations to do F ∨ S and ¬F , and by these, we can derive the actual obligation to do S:
As line 6 and 7 are not marked in any extension of this proof, O¬F and OS are finally MP ⊏ -derivable from Γ 3 . Likewise, we can finally derive O¬T in a MP ⊏ -proof from Γ 3 .
A Logic for Prioritized Beliefs
In this section, we will briefly show how MP ⊏ can be turned into an adaptive logic for (prioritized) belief base revision.
14 Prioritized belief bases are sequences of the form Ψ = Θ 0 , Θ 1 , Θ 2 , . . . , where each Θ i is a set of formulas, and the index of the sets denotes their plausibility degree: Θ 0 is the set of most plausible beliefs, Θ 1 the set of second most plausible beliefs, and so on. In the face of such a belief base, we may ask ourselves which are the "all-things-considered, actual" beliefs. Roughly speaking, it is the aim of a prioritized revision operation to maintain consistency at the level of actual beliefs, but nevertheless keep as much of the initial information in Ψ as possible.
It is fairly easy to adapt MP ⊏ for this context. All we have to do is replace the operators O and O i i∈N by their doxastic counterparts B and B i i∈N , adjust the respective interpretation of these operators, and provide a generic way to translate a prioritized belief base into a premise set.
The semantic structure of MP can be kept as it is: we have a set of sets of accessibility relations R 1 , R 2 , . . . -each of them corresponding to a B i -operator -and a single accessibility relation R that corresponds to the B-operator. B i A expresses that A has plausibility degree i. 15 As expected, B i A does not entail ¬B i ¬A. Hence the sets Θ i from the belief base are not assumed to be internally consistent. The B-operator refers to the "actual, all-things-considered" beliefs of a rational agent. These beliefs behave classically, just as the actual obligations did in MP. Let us call the resulting monotonic logic MPb, which stands for "the MP-variant for belief bases". The preceding makes it quite obvious how the translation should proceed. Where Ψ is as before, we simply define
Let us use Ω b i to denote the set obtained by replacing every occurrence of O i by B i , and every occurrence of O by B in each member of the set Ω i . The adaptive logic MPb ⊏ has exactly the same structure as MP ⊏ , but takes MPb as its lower limit logic and Ω b i i∈N as its sequence of sets of abnormalities. One peculiar aspect of MPb ⊏ , compared to other systems from the literature, is its dynamic proof theory. Another important property that is immediately carried over from MP ⊏ , is that MPb ⊏ reduces contradictions between beliefs to the level of disjunctions of atoms -recall Section 5.3 where this was illustrated for the deontic variant. Finally, all the meta-theoretic results from Section 3.3 obviously hold for MPb ⊏ as well.
Conclusion
Let us briefly summarize the main results of this paper. We have developed a logic MP ⊏ that deals with unconditional prioritized obligations and has a dynamic proof theory. We have described its main features and have established a number of intuitive properties of it. Concrete examples were presented, which illustrate the proof theory and highlight some differences with other approaches in the literature. Finally, we have provided an interpretation of a strucurally identical system MPb ⊏ , which can be applied to prioritized belief bases.
We promised to say a bit more about the restrictions we made in the introduction, as removing one or more of these restrictions should be a task for future research. First of all, it might still be interesting to see if we can develop systems that give up the restriction that the order has to be modular. To do so would imply that we cross the safe boundaries of the existing generic formats for adaptive logics -all adaptive logics developed so far are based on a modular order of the abnormalities. This work will hence require thorough investigations on the metatheoretical level.
We also restricted ourselves to a monadic framework. The extension to a dyadic deontic logic might lead to some problems, e.g. should obligations with more specific condition receive a higher priority rank, or should contrary-to-duty obligations overrule conflicting unconditional obligations whenever the former are cancelled? We refer to [33, 34, 14] for discussions of the various problems and paradoxes relating to conditional obligations. An extension of MP ⊏ to the dyadic case should be able to cope with these issues to some extent.
B Proof of Theorem 9
We prove the left-right direction and the right-left direction of Theorem 9 as two separate lemmas.
Lemma 4 If Γ O,C has MP-models, then every A ∈ O is CL-satisfiable and C is CL-satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose that for some A ∈ O, A is not CL-satisfiable. Let M = W, R, R, v, w 0 be an MP-model of Γ O,C -we derive a contradiction. Note that O i A ∈ Γ O,C , whence there is a R j ∈ R i such that, for all w ∈ W such that R j w 0 w, v M (A, w) = 1. However, since A is not CL-satisfiable, v M (A, w ′ ) = 0 for all w ′ ∈ W . Suppose that C is not CL-satisfiable. 
C Proof of Theorem 10
We first prove three lemmas: 
